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Chapter 15
Expatriatism: The Theory
and Practice of Open Borders
Chandran Kukathas
Every day, large numbers of people cross borders that separate one political
jurisdiction from another. Most do so legally, though many break the law
in changing jurisdictions. Many more do not cross borders, because they
dare not break the law or cannot cross undetected—sometimes because
they are denied permission to leave one jurisdiction, and other times be-
cause they are prohibited from entering another. Some cross borders fully
aware that they are leaving one deﬁned space and entering another, while
others have no idea that anything has changed or that the imaginary lines
that deﬁne distinct regions exist even in the imagination. Borders—political
boundaries—are such variable things that encounters with them can be
very different experiences. Entering Luxemburg from Belgium is almost
always a nonevent. Entering the United States from Mexico can be very
eventful. The purpose of this essay to ask why this is so, and whether it
must be so. Why must some borders be so difﬁcult to cross? Why can’t the
move from Mexico to the United States always be as easy as moving from
Belgium to Luxemburg? Why should some people be able to move so freely
and others not?
Another way to put this is to ask: Why can’t all borders be open? The
point of this essay is to address this question, both as a conceptual question
and as a theoretical—normative—question. Its concern is the movement
of people—not of goods or money—across political boundaries. In the end,
it tries to offer a defense of open borders. But any such defense must rest
on some account of what ‘‘open borders’’ means, and how such a thing is
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Expatriatism 325
possible. Thus the aim of the essay is to offer an account of the theory and
practice of open borders.1
Deﬁning Borders
Any defense of open borders must begin by explaining what borders are.
Borders are geographic boundaries demarcating or deﬁning political enti-
ties or legal jurisdictions. They can be used to distinguish countries or states
but can also distinguish a variety of other entities, including subnational
administrative units, such as provinces, counties, boroughs, townships, mu-
nicipalities, Indian reservations (United States), Indian reserves (Canada),
cantons, territories, and parishes; and supranational entities (such as em-
pires) or superstates (such as the European Union). Borders today are
clearly deﬁned boundaries that are no more than imaginary lines that do
not themselves occupy any space. They thus differ from the marchlands of
earlier times, when political entities were separated by border regions or
borderlands—spaces that were beyond the authority of the rulers on either
side. There are remnants of this past practice in the modern world in the
shape of demilitarized zones—such as that between North and South
Korea—but these are rarities. Borders are notional rather than physical,
and can run not only across lands but also across waters, along rivers,
through streets, and even through buildings.
Although borders can be delineated using physical objects or structures,
this is uncommon. The Great Wall of China, the Maginot Line, the Berlin
Wall, the Ceuta Border Fence between Spain and Morocco, and the physical
barriers Churchill dubbed the ‘‘iron curtain’’ are examples of structures
used to draw the boundaries between different regions. But nowadays polit-
ical boundaries are established by rules or laws rather than by fences and
gates. This point is a signiﬁcant one because it means that opening or clos-
ing borders is not a matter of adding or removing physical objects but of
changing rules. Indeed, it could even be a matter of changing legal arrange-
ments that have nothing to do—at least not directly—with movement
across borders. Barriers, when they exist at all, come in the form of controls
exercised at checkpoints when borders are crossed—controls that might
involve the presentation of identity papers, such as a passport, or visas, or
other entry permits.
The presence of a border signiﬁes the existence of some authority that
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326 Toward Normative Principles
operates within the boundaries of a demarcated territory. One of the rights
this authority may have is to exclude persons from its territory, but whether
or not it does will depend on the kind of entity the authority represents. In
international law, states have the right to determine whether, and under
what conditions, persons may enter their territories. Provinces, parishes,
and towns do not typically have such rights. Nonetheless, it is worth re-
marking that practice varies considerably. Although in international law
countries can exclude persons from their territories, this is not always a
straightforward matter. For example, under the Schengen Agreement con-
cluded among European countries in 1985 and 1990, the twenty-ﬁve coun-
tries of the European Union along with Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein, and
Switzerland adopted measures that have more or less done away with bor-
der controls. With the exception of Ireland and the United Kingdom, there
are no border controls of any signiﬁcance within this region of four hun-
dred million people. The Schengen Agreement also provides for a common
policy on the movement of temporary visitors, who may travel freely within
the region for up to three months. At the other extreme, Sabah and Sara-
wak, the states of Malaysia on the island of Borneo, require even Malaysian
citizens to obtain permission to enter their territories, and they impose
limits on the duration of visits and on what activities visitors can engage
in. Within states, other entities may also have rights to exclude: U.S. Indian
reservations, for example, may restrict entry onto their territories.
More often than not, however, the authorities within borders are re-
sponsible for attending to the interests of those within their jurisdiction
rather than keeping others out. Provinces, towns, and counties may deter-
mine what rights and obligations residents have without having any power
to determine who may become a resident. Even nation-states might ﬁnd
their capacity to restrict entry to their territories limited by international
and domestic law. For example, the United States, one of the nations that
have adopted the norm of jus soli, is obliged to admit anyone who was born
in its territory as a citizen. Germany, one of the nations that have adopted
the norm of jus sanguinis, cannot easily deny German residence or citizen-
ship to someone with German ancestry. Countries that are signatories to
the 1951 Refugee Convention cannot turn away those who have landed on
their territory and asked for asylum—at least, not until such a claim is
legally determined to be unfounded. Sometimes, simply crossing a border
can give a person rights that the authorities have no power to ignore.
A border, in sum, is a complex notion. It does not merely impose a
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physical or even a notional barrier to forbid or permit entry from one
region to another but speciﬁes, and in some cases works to determine, the
rights and obligations individuals and authorities have. Opening and clos-
ing borders is a matter not of opening or shutting gates but of changing
the working of a complex system of machinery. We should consider this
machinery in more detail to try to understand what open borders could
mean.
What Are Open Borders?
The openness of borders is clearly a matter of degree. How do we determine
whether a border is open or closed—or at least, how open a border might
be? To answer this question we need to consider the variety of ways, and
the different dimensions along which, borders operate to control the move-
ment of persons. Indeed, we need to recognize that borders can be open in
some respects and closed in others. Policy can therefore easily make borders
more open and yet, at the same time, more closed. This is because policy
can change the terms of entry in a number of different respects. It can vary
the terms by specifying (i) what kinds of people may enter and what status
they may hold on entering; (ii) how long they may stay; (iii) what qualiﬁ-
cations or characteristics they must possess to enter; and (iv) what proce-
dures they must follow to remain within a territory. Policy can also specify
(v) the number of people admitted in various categories. Nation-states typi-
cally impose strict terms in all ﬁve of these respects while other kinds of
jurisdictions do not, so most of the following discussion will focus on cross-
ing national boundaries.
Entry Status
Nation-states admit people onto their territories in a variety of categories. It
is easier to enter in some categories than in others. People move as tourists,
students, diplomats, military personnel, journalists, pilgrims, seasonal
workers, guest workers, resident scholars, sportsmen, performers, artists,
and immigrants. Most countries make it easy to enter as a tourist, more
difﬁcult to enter as a would-be resident or worker, and even more difﬁcult
to enter as an immigrant.
In each of these categories entry may be more difﬁcult or less difﬁcult.
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328 Toward Normative Principles
Entering as a tourist is easier in some countries than in others. Consider
these examples. For most people in North and South America, Australasia,
and limited parts of Asia (Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore)
entering Europe requires nothing more than turning up at a European port
or airport. (Everyone else must obtain a visa.) Australia is one of a number
of countries that requires everyone to obtain a visa, though it has loosened
this requirement by allowing citizens of some countries to obtain their visas
online or through travel agents. Brazil requires Australians, Americans, and
Canadians—but not British and most E.U. citizens—to obtain visas to enter
the country, and charges between $50 and $200 for one. Brazil, like many
countries, also requires most visitors (including Britons and E.U. nationals)
to have a return ticket and to show evidence of having sufﬁcient funds for
the duration of their stay. The United States exempts members of twenty-
seven countries from the requirement to obtain a visa to enter as a tourist,
though only three from Asia (Brunei, Japan, and Singapore) and none from
Africa or South America. It is possible to obtain a visa to travel in North
Korea, but only as a part of a state-run tour—no independent travel is
permitted.
Entering a country to take up employment is usually more difﬁcult than
entering it as a tourist, though the regulations governing this vary widely.
Most countries, and all developed countries, require visitors to obtain per-
mission to work, and whether or not permission is granted will depend a
range of factors, from seasonal demand for particular workers, to the work-
er’s country of origin, to status of the visitor (who might be eligible for a
temporary work visa for holidaying youths). Work visas for professionals
may be easy to obtain in some countries in some professions, but it is not
always possible for accompanying spouses to secure work permits. In the
United States, Australia, and Canada it is necessary for employers applying
to hire overseas professionals to demonstrate that no appointment could
be made from the ranks of the domestic workforce—though the extent to
which such claims are demonstrable is doubtful, and for the most part it is
the assurance of the applying employer that settles the matter.
Entering a country as an immigrant is invariably more difﬁcult than
entering it as a tourist, though here it has to be noted that there are many
kinds of immigrants and many kinds of admission. Immigrants might enter
the country with a view to staying temporarily but eventually returning to
their homelands; or enter with a view to reuniting with family members
who migrated earlier but with no intention of working; or enter with a view
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to establishing a second home for a part of the year; or enter with a view
to settling more permanently but never becoming a citizen; or enter with
an intention of becoming a full citizen. Equally, immigration policy may
encourage people to enter but discourage them from coming if they would
only be dependants rather than workers (and taxpayers); it might encour-
age them to become residents but make it difﬁcult to become citizens; and
it might welcome new citizens but require that they repudiate their former
citizenship.
Entry Duration
Most states control border crossing by limiting the duration of any visit.
Tourists may usually enter a country only for a limited time, even in cases
when they may reenter it without difﬁculty within hours of leaving it. Work
permits and visas also expire. Even those who enter with long-term or per-
manent employment secured often ﬁnd that their visas expire and have to
be renewed regularly. Many people have lived in countries for decades by
renewing their visas every year. In particular cases, however, work visas can
only be used for a ﬁxed period before the entrant has to either change status
or leave the country permanently.
Entry Qualiﬁcation
States also control border crossing by restricting entry to those with the
right characteristics or qualiﬁcations. Restrictions can be based on any
number of factors, including ethnicity, nationality, religion, political afﬁli-
ation, wealth, income, age, health, profession, and criminality. So, for ex-
ample, Australia restricted entry by ethnicity in the many years while the
White Australia Policy was in operation. Malaysia will not admit Israeli
nationals except in special circumstances (and forbids its citizens to visit
Israel). Every non-U.S. citizen entering the United States or applying for a
visa is asked: ‘‘Are you or have you ever been a member of the Communist
party or any organization dedicated to the violent overthrow of the United
States government?’’ Although it is not the case that membership of a com-
munist party automatically disqualiﬁes one from entry, it is something that
has to be satisfactorily explained. A lack of substantial wealth or high in-
come are not in themselves going to prevent anyone from gaining permis-
sion to enter a country, but many countries, including Canada and
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330 Toward Normative Principles
Singapore, will admit wealthy immigrants who can demonstrate an inten-
tion and capacity to invest in the country. People of advanced age can have
their applications to immigrate to Australia turned down on the grounds
that they will not live long enough to contribute enough in taxes to cover
the costs they will impose on existing taxpayers. Australia has also turned
away disabled would-be immigrants on the grounds that the costs of their
care would outweigh the ﬁnancial contribution they are likely to make over
a lifetime. (There is no provision for those who wish to waive their right to
public welfare in exchange for a right of entry.) Would-be visitors can be
denied entry, or legal residents deported, if they are found guilty of criminal
actions of varying degrees of seriousness. For example, a twenty-year-old
man who had been in the United States since he was a baby was deported
to Laos, his country of birth, in spite of having no family there and no
knowledge of its language or culture—as a result of being found guilty of
the illegal possession of a ﬁrearm.
Entrant Rights and Obligations
Finally, states can shape the pattern of border crossing by restricting or
limiting the rights of outsiders, or by imposing particular duties upon them.
For example, those who have entered as residents may be forbidden to
work in paid employment. Those with work permits may be restricted to
work with the sponsoring employer and prohibited from changing jobs.
Spouses of workers may be forbidden to work. Those free to work may ﬁnd
it impossible to work in their ﬁelds because their qualiﬁcations are not
recognized. Those with or without qualiﬁcations may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
compete with the local labor force because labor laws, including minimum-
wage laws, do not allow them to offer their services at a lower price. In
some countries noncitizens may not own certain forms of property—for
example, Thailand and Singapore restrict the rights of foreigners to buy
land or residential homes that are not apartments in multiapartment build-
ings. Foreigners can also ﬁnd they are limited by being ineligible for certain
forms of employment (notably in government), ineligible for social security
beneﬁts, and ineligible to participate in the political process (for example,
by voting in some or all elections). In some countries foreign residents
are prohibited from commenting on local politics, on pain of deportation.
Foreign nationals may also face reporting requirements, having to present
themselves regularly to immigration ofﬁcers, to inform authorities of
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changes of address, and to register their arrivals and departures. Penalties
for compliance failures can include deportation and loss of any right of
reentry.
Entry Quotas
Most states employ some measures to restrict the numbers of people enter-
ing and leaving the country. Though tourist numbers are not typically lim-
ited, tourism is controlled by states for various reasons. For example, Nepal
tries to limit the number of people trying to climb Mount Everest by im-
posing high fees on mountaineers. Countries where the volume of tourist
trafﬁc puts pressure on important sites have considered trying to limit
entry. And Western countries generally make it more difﬁcult for people
from poor countries to enter even as tourists because of the risk of overstay-
ing. But by and large, tourism is too lucrative to be limited. Entry in other
categories, however, is often substantially limited. The United States admits
foreign workers in a variety of visa categories but has ﬁrm limits in most of
them. It also admits many people as permanent residents through the green
card lottery, though no more than 55,000 are awarded each year. Australia
has varied its intake of immigrants each year but has tried to keep the
numbers within ﬁrm limits. It also has special places for humanitarian cases
and refugees, though again these are limited in number, and each year
many are turned away because the quota has been ﬁlled.
Open Borders
In the light of these observations about the way in which border crossings
and border crossers are dealt with, what can we say about what open bor-
ders are? The answer is that, if the openness of borders is a matter of degree,
borders can be more or less open in a variety of ways. People can enter
countries with a view to visit, to visit and work, to study, to study and work,
to reside, to reside and work, to perform, preach, or conduct research, or
to join the host society as a new citizen. State policy can open borders in
one or more respects while closing it in others. It might make entry easier
by granting more visas or removing visa requirements, by lowering visa
costs, by widening the scope of visa waiver programs, and even by ceasing
negative advertising.2 Yet at the same time it might make it more difﬁcult
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332 Toward Normative Principles
Table 15.1 Countries/States
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Entry Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No
Participation Yes Yes No No No (Yes) No (Yes)
Membership Yes No No No (Yes) (Yes) (Yes) No
to get work permits or permission to open businesses. It might increase the
number of student visas but impose stronger requirements that students
must return to their home countries, or make it harder for students to work
to support themselves. It might make it easier to enter the country to work
but make it harder to renew a work permit. It might make it easier to
become a resident but harder to become a citizen, or easier to become a
citizen but harder to enter in the ﬁrst place.
If the openness of borders is such a variable thing, one important prob-
lem then is the question of what really matters if one advocates open bor-
ders. For the sake of simplifying the problem let us say that there are three
dimensions along which the issue can be considered: entry, participation,
and membership. The ﬁrst dimension, entry, covers the freedom of foreign-
ers to enter and reside in a society. Participation covers foreigners’ right to
take up employment or to trade or open up a business. Membership covers
the right of foreigners to become more closely involved in the society—
perhaps acquiring the right to take government employment, or participate
in elections, or even stand for public ofﬁce.
A society with fully open borders would be one in which entry, partici-
pation, and membership were all possible. A less open society would be one
in which entry and participation were possible but membership not. A
much less open society would make entry possible but not participation
and membership. A society with completely closed borders would not per-
mit entry, participation, or membership. Table 15.1 presents the options
that are conceivable. Along the three dimensions there are eight possible
kinds of country, distinguished by degree of openness of borders. Country
1 has the most open borders and country 4 the least. Countries 5, 6, 7,
and 8 are not feasible possibilities. Country 5 cannot offer membership to
foreigners if it will not allow them to enter or participate. Country 6 cannot
offer participation, let alone membership, if it will not allow entry. Country
7 cannot really offer membership if it will not allow participation, even if
it will allow entry—and is therefore no different from country 3.
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Table 15.2
A B C
Entry Easy Hard Very hard
Participation Hard Very hard Easy
Membership Very hard Easy Hard
Table 15.3
A B C
Entry 5 2 8
Participation 5 7 2
Membership 5 9 2
Note: 1Easy, 10Very hard
This presentation of the possibilities obviously simpliﬁes matters con-
siderably. After all, as has already been noted, entry, participation, and
membership are all a matter of degree. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that
permitting entry is the ﬁrst requirement for open borders, since participa-
tion is not possible without it; and the right to participate is the second
requirement if we assume that membership, by its very nature, means hav-
ing full rights to enter and participate. To lose the right to participate is to
lose one’s rights of membership.3
To put the case for open borders, then, is really to put the case for
lowering or ending restrictions on foreign entry into, participation in, and
membership of a state or polity. Borders are more open as it becomes easier
to enter, participate, and join. However, what is more difﬁcult to determine
is how to interpret an easing of restrictions in some respects but a tighten-
ing of restrictions in others. Consider, for example, the three countries A,
B, and C, in Table 15.2. It’s not clear which of the three has the most open
borders. Country A is easy to enter but very hard to join as a citizen; B
makes it easy to acquire citizenship but very hard to win the right to work;
C is hard to enter but easy to gain working rights in (if you can get in, you
can work), yet still difﬁcult to join as a citizen.
Or consider another presentation of the same problem, in Table 15.3,
with a numerical weighting given to indicate the degree of difﬁculty of
earning rights to enter, participate in, or become a member of a polity.
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334 Toward Normative Principles
Would a move from A to B amount to a move to a regime with more
open or less open borders? Is C more open or less open than B or A? To
the extent that it is difﬁcult to say, the notion of open borders is unclear or
indeterminate. To say which regime has more open or less open borders we
need a theory of open borders. This means a theory that explains which
restrictions or limitations are more important than others. To the extent
that such a theory is a normative theory, it must offer an account of what
kinds of restrictions are more defensible or less defensible morally.
Toward a Theory of Open Borders
I want to argue that the most important dimensions along which borders
should be open are those of entry and participation. Membership is not a
trivial matter, but morally speaking it does not matter nearly as much as
the freedom or the opportunity to enter and participate in a society. It is
restrictions on entry and participation that are of most concern from the
perspective of an advocate of open borders. Before presenting the case for
this view, however, I want to look brieﬂy at the question of the purpose
(and justiﬁcation) of closing borders, and then at the prima facie case for
opening them.
Arguments for Closed Borders
The very important point to note at the outset is that very few people (or
states) advocate completely closed borders. We have already established that
the openness or closedness of a border is a matter of degree. The debate is
really about how open or closed borders should be. So my analysis of the
case for closed borders is of the case for substantial limitations on entry
into, participation in, or membership of a society—with the term ‘‘substan-
tial limitations’’ serving to specify only loosely the extent of restriction of
the movement of people.
Numerous arguments are advanced for closing borders, but most of
them are variations or versions of the following.
1. Homogeneity arguments. The existing society has a form or character
that would be eroded or corrupted if any or too many people of a different
kind were admitted, so entry has to be limited. The White Australia Policy
rested in part on such an argument. American resistance to Irish immigra-
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tion in the nineteenth century drew on it as well. Japan’s reluctance to
admit its Korean members to citizenship provides yet another example of
this thinking. Nowadays, many countries are concerned about admitting
‘‘too many’’ people from particular groups, or people who are not members
of the dominant group in the country, in case the change in the composi-
tion of the society proves problematic. This might mean concerns about
admitting some nationalities, members of some religions (such as Islam),
or people who speak other languages. Sometimes the argument is that it is
important to preserve the existing culture or tradition embodied in the
nation, so that it might endure over generations to come. The loss of Japa-
neseness or French Canadian society would be a loss in itself, and measures
taken to prevent the dilution and erosion of these societies are therefore
justiﬁed. A different argument is that a society that admits too many people
who are very different will ﬁnd it lacks the harmony and cohesion it once
had. This is bad in itself, for it means social conﬂict. It is also unfair on
existing members of society who might ﬁnd their surrounds and their lives
changing rapidly around them till they ﬁnd themselves living in a land that
is alien to them. The admission of foreigners should be restricted to ensure
that a homogeneous society does not become diverse in unfamiliar or un-
comfortable ways—even if diversity is not to be repudiated entirely.
2. Protection arguments. Closing borders protects some locals from for-
eigners in a number of ways. Economically, it gives locals a better chance
of employment if the extent of the labor market is limited. It also raises
domestic wages for the same reason. This clearly protects low-wage employ-
ees, but it can also beneﬁt those higher up on the salary scale, depending
on what kinds of entry restrictions are in place. Whatever the case may be,
the argument is the need to provide locals with economic protection against
competition from foreigners. It is important to note, however, that a choice
has to be made here to protect some locals at the expense of others, since
those who might beneﬁt from competitive foreign labor would be disadvan-
taged. Protection arguments are therefore always arguments not for pro-
tecting locals in general but for protecting some (possibly a majority of)
locals. Favored candidates for protection might include particular indus-
tries, particular professions, and particular cultural traditions.
3. Ecological arguments. Too large or too rapid an increase in the size of
the domestic population may be harmful to the local ecology. Some Austra-
lian environmentalists argue that the continent is overpopulated and that
its delicate natural ecology will be destroyed by population growth (or,
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some argue, unless the population is not substantially reduced). It is also
argued that population increase might leave domestic society unable to
cope with the resulting pressure on society’s infrastructure, since it will lead
to more congestion, more pollution, and a strain on public services, includ-
ing transport, sewerage, water, and power.
4. Social control arguments. Any stable society, the argument goes, needs
to be able to keep control of its population to guard against criminality,
political subversion, and terror. This requires close monitoring of the popu-
lation, and to that extent there must be restrictions on movement in and
out of the country as well as a close watch on movements within it by local
and national authorities.
5. Rent preserving arguments. Members of any country have beneﬁts
that accrue to them in virtue of their having access to opportunities outsid-
ers do not. They enjoy the rents that come to those who are advantageously
placed. Norwegian and Kuwaiti citizens are the beneﬁciaries of the wealth
that comes to them from the oil that lies within the national boundaries of
their states. But such rents may exist not just in the form of access to
natural resources but in the shape of the society itself. Someone lucky
enough to move to the United States from Haiti will be able to enjoy the
gains he can make by working or trading in a stable and prosperous econ-
omy with secure property rights and a good measure of personal safety
provided by the rule of law. Someone unable to leave Haiti may have lim-
ited opportunities to make any gains if everyone around her is poor, her
environment is unsafe, and the polity is unstable. Those who live in socie-
ties in which they enjoy the rents that go with residence or membership
can argue that they need to preserve their past and future gains by limiting
access to those rents.
6. Golden goose arguments. A related argument is that foreign entry to
a society should be restricted if too great an inﬂux of outsiders might
change or erode the traditions or practices that made the society prosperous
in the ﬁrst place. People from poor countries are poor often not because
their countries lack resources but because their economic and political sys-
tems are ramshackle. But if they move to prosperous countries with atti-
tudes or convictions that lead to the breakdown of the economic and
political systems of their new societies, everyone loses. Democracies with
generous welfare systems might be particularly vulnerable if large numbers
of poor immigrants become voters and vote themselves more beneﬁts. The
golden goose is killed by foreigners pressuring it for more eggs.
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7. Social justice arguments. In order to promote social justice within a
country, this argument goes, it may be necessary to restrict entry. This is
partly because the institutions of social justice can only function if they are
recognized as legitimate by the population, and an inﬂux of foreigners
might lead to people questioning their obligation to contribute to sustain-
ing those institutions. This may mean that the welfare of outsiders will have
to be sacriﬁced to some degree as they are denied admission, but if social
justice matters, then borders will have to be closed at least to some degree—
perhaps to a considerable degree.
Arguments for Open Borders
To put the case for opening borders it is necessary to address the arguments
for closing them. But before going on to do this it would be useful to note
what general reasons there might be for not restricting the movement of
people from one country to another. There are several arguments worth
considering.
1. Arguments from freedom. Closing borders means restricting individ-
ual freedom. It means preventing people from moving from one place to
another and denying people the opportunity to trade, or sell their labor, or
enjoy friendships that are important to them. While this is not a consider-
ation that is necessarily decisive, it is signiﬁcant nonetheless. Any justiﬁca-
tion for closed borders has to offer reasons strong enough to warrant the
interference with individual freedom—both of those who wish to move
and of those who are unable to welcome outsiders as partners, neighbors,
colleagues, or employees.
2. Arguments from global prosperity. The free movement of people, it
can be argued, can contribute enormously to global prosperity. In the bar-
est economic terms, the mobility of factors of production is a good thing,
for it allows resources to be deployed where they are most productive. This
holds not only for money or physical forms of capital but also for labor or
for human capital more generally.
3. Arguments from justice. Though it might be argued that social justice
requires closed borders, it can also be argued that it is unjust to deny many
people, especially the world’s poor, access to the beneﬁts of moving to
places where they can take a greater share of the wealth the world can
provide. Even if wealthy countries begin to contribute much more in for-
eign aid to poor countries, it is unlikely that this will do nearly as much to
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make the poor more prosperous as would allowing them to move, enrich
themselves, and enrich others by remitting a portion of their newfound
wealth to their distant friends and relatives.
4. Arguments from humanity. Even if justice does not mandate sharing
national wealth with people from other societies, a principle of humanity
suggests that that it is difﬁcult to justify turning the poorest people away
from the doors of the richest societies. It bears noting that, on the whole,
the well off and the rich have little trouble crossing most borders. The
purpose of closed borders is usually to keep out the poor. Given that refu-
gee camps around the world are homes to millions of people, unable to
return whence they came but with nowhere decent to go, a policy of closed
borders looks difﬁcult to justify.
5. Arguments from sectional advantage. Particular groups stand to gain
from open borders. Typically, some business enterprises stand to beneﬁt
from an inﬂux of immigrants who increase the size of the labor pool and
thus push wages downward.
How to Open Borders
What should be evident from the two sets of arguments above is that it
would be difﬁcult to make a decisive case for open borders. The problem
is that the kinds of arguments in favor of open borders do not, in them-
selves, supply indefeasible reasons for not closing them. Nor do they, in
themselves, undermine (let alone refute) the arguments for restrictions on
the movement of people. How can a case for open borders be made?
The most important thing to recognize is that any argument for open
or closed borders (remembering that openness is a matter of degree) must
involve trading off some considerations against others. The defenders of
closed borders do have a point (or a number of points). Opening borders
can lead to a loss of homogeneity, may disadvantage some groups, will
mean sharing some of the rents currently enjoyed exclusively by a country’s
residents, and could make it more difﬁcult to sustain institutions of social
justice. But equally, there is no denying that border controls limit freedom,
impose inefﬁciencies on the working of the global labor market, amount to
unjust treatment of at least some of those who are excluded from particular
societies they wish to enter, and require neglecting the needs of some people
in desperate need. The question is really not so much one of whether bor-
ders should be open or closed simpliciter but of how the tradeoff should be
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made. A theory of open borders, therefore, must be a theory of how to
trade off the values that mandate openness against the ones that suggest
closure. In the remainder of this essay I want to offer the outline of how
such a tradeoff should be made, and to draw out the implications of such
a view.
A defensible theory of open borders, I suggest, is one that gives little
weight to homogeneity arguments, even less weight to protection argu-
ments, and zero weight to rent-preserving arguments. Greater weight is
given to golden goose arguments and also to social justice arguments. The
reason for giving little weight to homogeneity considerations is that, in the
end, what matters is how the lives of individuals go; the color of a society
(literally as well as ﬁguratively) does not matter. It may matter to individu-
als if a society is transformed so rapidly that their lives become disrupted
and even intolerable, but it does not matter whether the next generation is
different from this if the next generation is content with its character. The
preservation of homogeneity is of little importance in itself.
The reason for giving little weight to protection arguments is that using
border controls to protect some groups within a society usually means dis-
advantaging other groups within the same society. It may be that some
groups that are particularly poorly off have some claim to being protected,
but even protecting them may be at the expense of others who are just as
poorly off and who would gain by the contributions of outsiders. It is hard
to see why this would be justiﬁed. Protecting groups who are well off to the
disadvantage of other members who are well off also seems to be no espe-
cially good reason to prevent outsiders from entering a society. It is not a
good reason to open borders, either, because lifting restrictions gives ad-
vantages to particular groups.
The reason for giving no weight to rent-preserving arguments is that it
is difﬁcult to see why the fact that one already enjoys certain advantages is
any reason why one should keep it. There may not be any reason to conﬁs-
cate someone’s wealth even if that wealth is just the result of good fortune.
But it is hard to see why such a person would be justiﬁed in denying others
the opportunity to enrich themselves also.
A good measure of importance should be attached to golden goose ar-
guments, since the possibility that an inﬂux of people would undermine or
destroy the institutions that made the society attractive to foreigners may
be a serious one. In practice, it may be that the number of foreign entrants
needed to make this a real concern may be much higher than the number
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likely to try to visit or immigrate. Nonetheless, the fact that an inﬂux in
such numbers is in principle possible may serve to set an outer limit on the
openness of borders.
Some importance should also be attached to social justice arguments.
Though these may be criticized on a variety of grounds, the salient point is
that if the question of justice is going to be raised it is at least an open
question what is the relevant context within which justice in distribution is
to be considered. While many universalists argue that justice must be global
in scope, there is also a substantial case for viewing justice as requiring the
existence of an ethical community. Conceding the signiﬁcance of social
justice arguments is a way of recognizing that there is a tradeoff to be made
between doing justice within societies and doing justice across societies. It
might be tempting to deny that there is a tradeoff involved, and that justice
only applies in one of these contexts. But such a conclusion seems to ﬂy in
the face of a dilemma that is both signiﬁcant and real.
Finally, some weight should be given to social control arguments. If the
existence of states or polities is taken as a given, then there has to be some
recognition of their need to do what is necessary to preserve their integrity.
For this they may need to monitor population movements to some degree
and have some power to keep out criminals and political subversives.4 Once
again, this supplies a criterion for closing borders to some degree but not
for limiting movement in any substantial way.
The tradeoffs among these considerations is only one side of the story.
The other side is the matter of whether borders are to be open or closed
with respect to entry, participation, and membership. If any signiﬁcant
weight is given to social justice and social control arguments in favor of
closing borders, then it becomes important that existing members of states
must retain the capacity not only to govern but also to limit the extent to
which outsiders can acquire the capacity to do so. Moreover, they will need
the capacity to limit the ability of outsiders to enter society and take advan-
tage of the beneﬁts of participation and membership without making any
reciprocal contribution. This means that there may be a case for closing
borders in the sense of limiting access to citizenship and welfare entitle-
ments, but less justiﬁcation for limiting entry into the society or restricting
rights of participation in economic and civil life. This does not mean it
would be justiﬁed to limit indeﬁnitely a newcomer’s access to full member-
ship and all the political and welfare rights this might involve. Here again
there is a tradeoff: if borders are to be as open as possible but complete
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openness in all respects is not feasible, then membership should be forgone
in return for greater opportunity for entry and participation.
The Price of Open Borders
This way of defending open borders will not be congenial to some of its
advocates. One of the most prominent political theorists defending open
borders, Joseph Carens, has indeed suggested that the case for open borders
is best presented as resting on a theory of democratic justice.5 A just society,
in his view, can offer no good reasons for excluding some people from full
membership—and considerations of feasibility are, in the end, considera-
tions that take us away from answers to the question of what is morally
justiﬁed in some deeper sense. The argument offered here, I think Carens
would say, yields to concerns of political strategy and so, ultimately, does
not offer the best moral argument for open borders.
Nonetheless, I suggest that this is the best way of thinking about open
borders and how they can be justiﬁed. This is because the morality of politi-
cal life is the morality of tradeoffs, not the morality of perfect justice. There
is politics because people hold different values and also rank or weight
differently the values they share. The existence of states, and therefore of
borders, is a reﬂection of this very fact. In a perfectly just world, if such a
thing could be imagined, there would be no open borders because there
would be no borders and no states. If we begin our inquiry into the matter
of open borders with the assumption that states and borders are ﬁxed
points in the moral and political universe, then any answer we give the
question of how open borders can be must be an answer that is consistent
with the continued existence of states and borders. And it must be consis-
tent with an understanding of human motives and human behavior that
gives the existence of the state its point. The state in the end is not simply
an administrative unit dedicated to the task of administering to technical
matters of social organization; it is a political entity that reﬂects that fact of
human disagreement and conﬂict.
That said, however, this account of open borders will also be greeted
skeptically from the perspective of those who would see it as much too
sanguine about the feasibility of open borders. Can borders really be open
such that entry and participation are fairly permitted (even as rights of
membership are difﬁcult to acquire), without great pressure being put on
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the institution of the state as more people enter its domain? If it is the
business of the state to bring about social justice within the polity, how will
it attend to the concerns of full citizens and also address the demands of
foreign participants in the life of the society? The answer, I think, is that in
reality states will always struggle with this problem and will respond by
keeping borders more tightly closed. To open borders, from the state’s
point of view, is always to invite trouble.
This essay began with the question of how open borders could be. It
has tried to answer that question primarily through a conceptual analysis
of the idea of a border. The ethical conviction underlying the essay is that
open borders—a world in which people could move about freely without
being hindered from residing or working where they pleased—are highly
desirable. The conclusion it reaches, however, is that there is a limit to how
open borders can be if they are to remain borders at all.
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